I cannot be in the company of still active Yale colleagues without having far too many memories. To suffer reminiscences, Freud noted, is to suffer neurosis, and this should probably not be inflicted-even on deserving friends! Nor has Fritz Redlich done anything so drastic, in spite of being busted in bronze and hung in portraits, for us not to celebrate his astonishingly productive present.
structure-the science base underlying their use-is too often uncomprehendingly ignored, as are the social consequences of technology. Medicines Biological psychiatry is a term I've always disliked. It evokes an image of narrow and rigid mechanisms as counterposed to a broad humanistic concern and philanthropic receptivity to the life of the mind. This is somehow viewed as opposed to the mere molecular "machinery." The events in the engine room are seen as lacking in both wonder and challenge to man's highest aspirations, and as serving only to power the imagination and values of lofty staterooms above. That such distorted "humanism" can be the defensive slogan of the lazy, masking self-indulgence, and that ignorance of design is an affront to the highest comprehension of the human potential, is too often ignored.
In human biology, we don't, in any event, have a Society of Biological Internists, although we recognize special emphases around organ systems or treatments. Psychiatry today-as was the case 30 years ago for internal medicine-is now ready for true specialists in the major disorders and treatments. Hopefully this will not be at the expense of fragmenting its core unity. I would prefer, then, to preach what Redlich so consistently practiced here: whatever areas of psychosocial or biological inquiry enhance psychiatry's understanding of the regulation and development of behavior is welcome and of teaching interest-if it is spiced with a healthy skepticism! Further, it is impossible to conceive of human biology without concern for the experience of the mind and the events of behavior, or of psychiatry without both. Thus biological psychiatry without a behavioral science is as useless as a hammer without an anvil-and if misapplied, perhaps as dangerous. So while psychiatristinvestigators may spend a lifetime tracing specific molecular sequences, the ultimate reference is to behavings. Nor in clinical science are the advent of pharmacotherapies and various group therapies antagonistic developments. Although the means and mechanisms are different, they both evoke brain operations involving attention, arousal, and the phasings of cognitive or interpersonal processes. I do not intend this as a melioristic view; rather, it is essential to a basic biological viewpoint of man as a part of nature.
What we once called biological psychiatry has come out of the closet, not as a perversion to skew our vision of human behavior, but as a part of the whole. That is how I believe fundamentally it should be taught. And in going from mind to brain, or in teaching pharmacotherapeutics, there is no warrant for us to be mindless in concepts or practice, or ignorant of the life of the socio-culturally tutored mind. If we indeed teach the neurobehavioral sciences in the context of other active psychiatric developments and in conjunction with the preclinical sciences, our ability to educate will occur in the general framework of medical education-of human biologywhether at the pre-or postgraduate levels. The general climate of this effort of medical education deserves some attention because it is highly relevant to what we, in psychiatry, are educating for.
PROFESSIONAL DELEGITIMIZATION AND MEDICAL EDUCATION What has always provided the attractiveness of medical careers is the tension between knowledge and its application and the awesome challenge to therefore exercise skilled judgment in the context of specific human need. But these polarities of action and reflection also pose the problematics. There are today obvious perturbations affecting professional roles and practices. In brief, both poles of the dialectic of knowledge and action are simultaneously straining.
One pole is the explosion of knowledge. The other is a pressing focus on distributive justice-on what to do for whom. Toumlin [1] has noted this in the academic disciplines as an intrinsic alternation between the substantive and technological; concerns of how to do it and why and value concerns-for whom to do it. There is an alternation between Truth and Justice, echoed in the arts and knowledge disciplines as swings between the formal and the functional, the classic and the romantic, the timeless and the temporal. Biomedicine clearly contains these swings within it; thus the recurring tensions between preclinical and clinical sciences, between education and training, science and its "doings" also reflect the knowledgeaction polarity.
Without cataloging the fundamental value confusions epitomized by the Guadalajara rule, few would question that we have for the moment, in broad public policy, lost the balance between public interest, resource allocation and the art of the possible as adjudicated both by scientific evaluation and responsible lay review. The governance of adjudications in science and control over the disposition of its efforts and products are different functions. But the contemporary regulatory and legislative clamors strike not only at the very act of medical decision-making, but also at the very value of knowledge and the social institutions necessary for any medical system linked to the sciences. The evidentiary process is not identical with the law's adversarial process, nor should we forget that Lysenkoism-imposed by autocrats or by populists-can be the fate of the social institution we call science.
There are a variety of both serious and vulgarized belief systems challenging our educative and professional sanction. These question who it is that should deliver medical care and what the emphasis on medical care should be. Thus general medicine is attacked because it is not exclusively preventive medicine; academic centers, because they foster research and thereby raise expectations; and basic biological and behavioral sciences, perhaps because new findings may expand costly services, but-more disturbingly-because such effort is thought to distract us from human services and social reform.
There is a real need to ration health care and shape public expectations on utilizing expertise. But many are attempting to reduce consumer demand by enhancing mistrust, or by inventing counterfeit expertise or by diverting attention into various fads and movements. We are thus witnessing a progressive "delegitimization" both of medicine as a profession and its science base. Both lay cults and experts now promise to reduce costs and to significantly impact morbidity and mortality by advocating or legislating a frenzy of good hygiene and generalized abstinence.
Psychiatry predictably will then be invited to make people behave rather than to develop and apply our burgeoning science base to the major psychoses and biobehavioral dysfunctions. I see no evidence at all that the hard social-psychological research that is necessary truly to understand the evolution of personal orientations to disease and discomfort, or in the utilization of "medicine men," is being programmed in the current fad of "life-style." We will ever more frequently hear the call to summon the "behavioral sciences" (whose success in changing the life-style of our ( in which we cannot distinguish who is striking, struck or stricken), there may well be a confusion that it is simply and solely the site of training that is equivalent to a sound core education in medicine. So what is at question is not only our capacity to implement education, but the valuing of it. And it is not at all clear as to whether we will have to choose between the polarities of educating and vocational training, rather than an artful conjunction of both.
UNIVERSITY EDUCATION AND TRAINING
We are indeed moving from a university definition of medical education to that of the normal school. We are in the midst of a huge new ritualized industry of continuing medical education and evaluation which is only a part of the "industrialization" of academic medicine. It is a trend in which the exact sum of each of the conceivably calculable parts is mistaken for the whole; in which the notion of accountability is replaced by countability; and authenticity vouchsafed solely by a syllabus. Credibility is no longer synonymous with creditability; rather than concern with the categorical imperative, we are obsessed by the "category one" imperative! Training has utility. But the invitation today is to substitute programmed devices for education and to teach psychiatry in the burgeoning primary care area by providing a ritual for drug treatment and a minimum of the necessary knowledge base. There are many uses of "training" in the course of education in human biology. The growth of computer and information sciences, the application of behavioral analysis and learning theories not only has advanced the neurobehavioral sciences and experimentation, but has accompanied the kind of analyses of medical decisionmaking which Feinstein has so probingly advanced for medicine. Psychiatry still awaits this inquiry. Educators increasingly are attending to precise specification of what they are about. Such devices help to teach us how we think, as well as to provide computer programs, algorithms and other incremental aids to learning. Yet the invitation today is to substitute devices for education and to machine a product in terms solely of presumptive (short-sighted) service system needs. It is too soon to know whether or not pharmacotherapeutics and psychodiagnostics, now so crucially linked to therapy, can be wittingly or willingly applied by primary caretakers. If this can occur, we will need fewer but far more highly educated psychiatric specialists. That would very much change the level and focus of education! Thus the need for a thoughtful approach to the transfer of knowledge from the bench to bedside-so-called technology transfer-is clear. But the term is also a Congressional code word proffered to afford an escape from special knowledge and clinical judgments, and to contain costs. Some envision that in our culture we can train as physicians an equivalent of the Maoist foot doctor who will implement the single best average treatment for the average expectable disorder in Psychiatry, I am convinced, must be taught in the community of the clinical disciplines and their basic sciences. But the uneasy link between service and the generation and transmission of knowledge brings into question whether this can be done. The service link today involves such massive cash flow issues as to make it problematic whether universities will long tolerate this fiscal perplexity in their midst. Action and reflection again pose polar tensions as provosts and presidents, basking under the scientists' grant-contingent overhead lights, peer at their service budgets and see red! Historically no university has been entirely comfortable with its medical school. After all, doctors are people who, while ministering to misery, touch and feel-at least once they did. For our academic colleague in the humanities, touching in teaching might be turpitude-at least before the current crime of chauvinism! So in this uneasy perch, as we think of new emphases in psychiatric education, we must confront the fact that there will probably only be a few university centers and fortunate collections of opportunities, minds and purpose that characterize a university school of medicine.
There is no question that we will emerge from this climate of clamor and disarticulation of our perceptions of the rules of evidence and our valuing of it. We will find some way for appropriate exchanges of competencies between interested parties, be these the public and the profession or the educator and his student. This social function of education in regulating the tension between thought and action is not dissimilar from other tutoring functions in human growth and development. A part of the aim of medical education is thus a moral one. The aim is for the student to learn in the context of supervised practice how to regulate himself and in so doing how not only to utilize scientific information, but how to regard it when it is not directly useful.
THE "OUT OF PHASE" GROWTH OF PSYCHIATRY
What I do find auspicious and unnoted in contemporary psychiatry-a development "out of phase" with the decline in medical education-is the way in which both its heritage and new developments are coalescing into a distinct emphasis on the major psychoses and mental dysfunctions. The putative mid-19th-century father of academic psychiatry-Wilhelm Greisinger-was thwarted in his academically centered design for coherent treatment systems. Using his qualifications as an internist for sanction, he ensconced psychiatry within the medical school in Berlin, established bedside teaching (an astonishing necessity to "introduce" the patient and the studentclinician), and provided a clinical emphasis with wards and clinics. He designed halfway houses and different arrangements within the community in the hope of dealing specifically with the various distinct subpopulations which comprised psychiatric work and posed different problems. But organized psychiatry in the rural state hospitals opposed this academically centered coherent design for a differentiated psychiatry.
The problem was-and to a great extent still is-that different populations, conceptually important for psychiatry, are encountered in widely different settings, at different phases of illness, dysfunction and recovery. The challenge for 150 years has been to bring the necessary span of inquiry and expertise to bear and to overcome the relative isolation of clinical activity and inquiry from the scrutiny and assessment of the academic sciences. Almost exactly 11 years ago [3] , I noted that Yale was poised to shift the balance between action and reflection through the Connecticut Mental Health Center with both its service challenge and its research base. [4] , supraspinal influence on peripheral motor neuron action [5] , eye tracking [6] or evoked potential analysis, all can be logically pursued in the service of important questions bearing on disease and its treatment. What are now known or knowable central neural or biochemical events can more frequently be deduced by peripheral measures in man [7] .
Most of the current measures in psychobiology reflect central drug actions, but others are more directly revealing of a sequence of pathophysiological processes. Still others, as traits and markers, are useful to studies of individuals at risk and for pedigree analysis. Such work is useful in bringing more specific treatments-and estimates of their efficacy-to specific subpopulations of depressed and schizophrenic individuals. In brief, while the incidence of major dysfunctions has not discernibly changed over 150 years, the appreciation and recognition of mental dysfunctions, and some degree of specificity in their treatment and remarkable success in preventing relapse, is indeed possible. And if measures of blood levels of substrates and metabolites in man help-as they promise to do-to guide and predict therapy in specific patients, this too should be a major practical gain.
The agonizing irony, however, is that this more differentiated set of observations, hypotheses and interventions has but recently become available because of the momentum and investment begun 30 years ago, and in the current climate could be readily abandoned. Psychiatry, somewhat later than Internal Medicine, now has the need and capacity to subspecialize; one can even predict that the depressed patient could be attended by-or receive consultation from-a psychiatric specialist in depression rather than the renaissance generalist of the past. Thus at a time when general medicine has to face its crises of over-specialization, the development of psychiatry requires subspecialties. At This enhanced canniness about what lies behind and what might evolve from symptomatic behavior represents the beginnings of an eventual psychosocial "anatomy and physiology" of behavior disorder. The proposition that behavior is multiply determined, and the observations of subjective motivational meanings and dynamics attached to all experience, does not, of course, mean that we necessarily, through a glimpse of these processes, always gain significant leverage that is effective for behavior change or the prevention of disorder. Rather, it tells us something of the inevitable functioning of mental life. When we see a patient with pyrexia and right lower quadrant rebound tenderness, we do not insert a probe into the hypothalamus because that is where physiology has taught us that temperature is regulated, but diagnose appendicitis with an understanding of the mechanism of the febrile reaction. Our intervention is proximal and pragmatic, and not a rote replication of physiological facts. And so it is with applications of psychological "anatomy and physiology." We can better identify and assess symptoms and direct our psychological interventions with a better sense of their goal and limited utility. Today there is also a greater emphasis on delineating differences that make a difference, on observation and testing of hypotheses, and on understanding the conditions in which psychological mechanisms operate. What is critical is that these "conditions" frequently are the biological referents of behavior, and manipulation of them an increasingly important therapeutic target which ultimately facilitates the acquisition of optimal psychological functioning.
The dynamic schools of psychiatry also taught us that pausing for self-knowledge in the context of reflective one-to-one relationships could be one of man's adaptive techniques, and a wide range of contemporary interventions either owe much to their psychoanalytic origins and do not admit it, or call themselves psychoanalytic when they are actually quite derivative. It is above all clear that the discovery of the transference has been important to the training of psychiatrists. Indeed its inevitability is an adaptive trait providing not only the potential for growth and treatment, but for nurturance and aid in moments of stress and phases of dependence-and hence is intrinsic to the doctor-patient relationship. I believe it takes several generations to master and sift through the utility of discoveries that reflect on or derive from subjective experience, and especially to learn how to teach and utilize them well and appropriately in psychiatry.
So today we do not advocate practicing the 50-minute hour with each patient, while we hopefully can still teach with "one-to-one. " And we have tantalizing glimpses into the future. In an extension of the various molecular coding systems which carry out their chores at some distance from the grand double helical design, we now know of polypeptides such as endorphins the body's opiates. Other receptors specific for valium-related compounds may provoke a search for endogenous substances related to intrinsic defences against anxiety and dysphoria. Another tack is the recognition that morphine-or lobotomy-produce an indifference to internal signals of pain. Are there neocortically linked pathways whereby endogenous or synthetic peptides could produce "indifference" to the internal noise and static to which the psychotic so intensely attends? In brief, new ways to arrive at rearrangements of internal regulations may be found. But tempting as such futurism may be, our current focus on neuroregulatory substances remain to be articulated with the more complex arrangements of the "triune brain" of MacLean.
That brain is built to behave. Its ongoing behavioral disposition and activity is the key to the influence of the next signal or input for which sensorimotor systems are set or prepared. So-called corollary discharge tells us that overt responses have been internally signalled (to central sensorimotor control systems) before or just as the behavior emerges. And it's best we teach a healthy wariness of conceiving ofjuices as necessarily "forcing" behavioral states upon these ongoing neuronal systems. Precise lesions depleting cortex or hypothalamus of norepinephrine do not affect the regulation of sleep, sleep phases or activation. Amines may influence the quality of linkage, organization and timing-and hence the intensity-of behaviors and hence their adaptive efficiency; this does not mean that regulation of basic functions won't occur in their absence. One juice-one disease is not likely. Although we know of drugs that may reliably produce a model psychosis, and of enzymes in man that can produce psychotogens, I know of no synthetic or endogenous molecules-including reserpine-that directly and reliably produce a model depression.
We should thus teach that there may be changes in current dogma-our working hypotheses and metapharmacology-remembering that amphetamine was once a model anti-depressant and currently is a model for schizophrenia; postencephalitic Parkinsonism was an organic model for schizophrenia and current dopamine blockade therapy would have us postulate Parkinsonism as antithetical to schizophrenia. If we today teach well, we need not in the future be caught with our categories down! What is clear is that neuronal assemblies can be studied. Behaviorally relevant basic processes (inhibition, habituation, sensitization, adaptation, and rate control) and regulation of behavioral associations and dissociations, can be increasingly approached. What we can learn about the fundamental dimensions of overt behaviors can be as startling as past discoveries in depth psychology and neural science.
THE BIOLOGICAL VIEWPOINT IN PSYCHIATRY
Now in spite of my title and charge, it should be obvious that I do not intend a paean of praise for the range of exciting developments in what is called biological psychiatry. Rather, in this broad but growingly coherent base of pragmatically oriented psychiatry, there has been a wide range of relevant investigatory thrusts, and I see biological viewpoints, as well as biological discoveries, as a unifying rather than fragmenting force. Most of our academic forefathers indeed had a major fascination with the mind/ body problem: how living matter can accommodate the links of bodily function, subjective experience and overt behavior. The link of nerves, humors, acts and objects can today be found in a wide array of studies in experimental biopsychology, which might help reveal how controls within the brain are organized and linked to the behaving organism and its environmental nutriments. In a deeper sense, this has been the concern of general biology: to establish links between molecules and behaviors, studying the codes which produce the modalities through which the environment shapes biological destiny. General biology is concerned with the adaptation of populations. Those of us who study individuals, raphe nuclei and projections, or Aplysia, are similarly interested in adaptation and in a range of responses based not only on predesigned programs-Lorenz's "internal schoolmarms"-but on the information conveyed by the environment.
All biology is thus insolubly linked to a transactional and developmental view of behavior: from evolution to embryology, from the ontogenesis of behavior to complex problems of behavior change [8] . We can no longer afford not to appreciate the manifold of nature and nurture, nor to be distracted by fears of reductionism. Perhaps we could borrow the wisdom of Pascal. He wondered why learning-the acquisition of habit-was not natural. And he answered that nature itself was only first habit, while habits are second nature. In our attempts to understand individuality (rather than solipsistically celebrate its subjective manifestations), we can see that it is the very tools of nature that provide for the variability we cherish. The study of isolated systems has shown that it is the very design of the way we are prewired and genetically coded or preset that requires individual differences as well as the operation of environmental events for the realization of genetic potential. Similarly, it is mainly in studies of isolated assemblies that, in constructional analysis, the brain reveals itself. From such banal witnesses as fossils, peas, bacteria and fruit flies we construct our knowledge of molecular biology. So the study of design and adaptation of living organisms, their concomitant balance of stability and change, the givens of nature and their peculiar skew towards efficient flexibility for adaptation, is our business.
These views emerge in part out of 19th century physiology and philosophy-from Bernard and from Bergson-and have evolved today to what is known as structuralism or control and regulation theory, or systems theory and the like. In brief, concepts that use the idea of holism-of the integration and coordination and goal seeking and setting of the component parts-are variations of this basic theme. The rules are that the state of the organism changes but not the laws it obeys; the organism-through its mechanisms-tends always towards equilibrium. Regulatory structures are given and so situated as to evolve. They exist to diminish rather than aggravate perturbation, and hence tend towards persistence, redundancy and stability and permit change in the service of this function. With perturbation, the organism regulates itself to move somehow from the disturbance, and with feedback systems to construct new set points and new equilibria if necessary. Thus when we are studying amine levels, or the metabolites in urine, CSF and blood, we are catching a snapshot of a system of regulated equilibria with their compensatory processes, rather than a unidirectional response to perturbation.
Freud in his Project understood the nervous system similarly as consisting of contrivances for transforming external quantity to quality in the service both of survival and minimized perturbation. The transduction of energy and information at the synapse-this change of state-indeed is where modern physiology directly meets the mind/ body problem, a change from one state to the next. Regulatory structures evolve in transactions. For Freud, the explanation of vivid states, hysteria dreams and forgetting provided the text through which the operations of these basic biological regulatory principles could be constructed [9] . Sherrington, Eccles and Sperry have also utilized both clinical and experimental data for such models of the control systems through which bodily and environmental needs can be transacted. All try to build a picture of a brain that can conform to the requirements of analyzed behavior. And since Hughlings Jackson, some hope to learn from the operations of brain what components of behavior should more fruitfully be analyzed! This general mode of biological thought and design extends to our clinical work as well. We see symptoms not necessarily as givens, but as reactions; schizophrenic symptoms as restitutive attempts to cope after some prior and as yet unknown rupture or injury. We can look at depressive agitation-the escalatingly intense self castigation-as some thwarted attempt on the part of the organism to mobilize itself and reduce immobilizing pain. Our various therapies-from getting the patient angry to drug effects-all aim at the mobilization of the patient into goal directed activity. Physiological and behavioral systems are not static.
Nor should we forget advances in the behavioral sciences. Given the human's intrinsic developmental lags, Freud saw the specifics of a neurosis as ultimately based on two factors: "intensity," or factors related to reception of input-and "accidental" factors-environmental events. Their timing was crucial. And today conditioning theories are teaching us the importance of so-called "incidental reinforcers" that somehow are so coupled with ongoing behaviors as to lead to maladaptive and entrenched behavior-polydypsia and colitis, for example. The determinants of behaviors that become inflexible or entrenched are not at all well understood. But it is clear that in its disposition to behave, organisms-say a rat working on a simple schedule of reinforcement-can reliably learn these apparently maladaptive responses. It appears that chance-induced events, because of their timing, somehow create reinforcement set points-these then become the determinants of what the behavior is behaving for. Thus while often the behavioral reinforcer can be readily empathized and identified, we know that with certain manipulations animals will work very hard to receive electric shock to the feet. We know that humans too manifest rigidities and often incomprehensible repetitive behaviors. For the masochist, it may be that the unconscious guilt and cathartic indignation are secondary to other aims around which the behavior is organized. Perhaps it is not the bruise, but the reliable evocation of the loss of control of the aggressor which is reinforcing. For the addict, the ability to self-administer from moment-to-moment is a mastery which transcends the obvious damaging consequences around which behavior can be powerfully organized. The point is that many such regulations require an objective analysis of behavior to discern their presence and role, however their subjective elaborations are construed. In behavior therapies we know we can treat symptoms as dysfunctions in their own right and that with analysis of the contingencies sustaining the symptom, whatever our ignorance of the origins of behavior, we can help the patient gain momentum that competence and mastery bring, as well as gaining symptom relief. In brief, we know that we learn from many modalities, our muscles as well as our head, as well as our reflection on the backlog of experience. What 
THE COMPREHENSION OF MIND
It is the destiny of ontogenesis that we are built to "know" more than we can explicate, to mean more than we can convey; we thus have language intrinsically built for metaphor. Such mentalistic language must be used initially to understand brain and behavior. But in the sequential educational process by which we transcend our givens, we intend to understand the language of brain processes. Thus the brain has a mind of its own! Molecules speak in coded language to molecules, and membranes to membranes, and so forth. So we will do no favor to talk about our drugs as mood changers when we know that they are affecting cognitive, rate and perceptual processes, nor to hint at luridly specific behavioral control when we know that we deal always with transactional and state-dependent processes. And we know that drugs affect stop and start mechanisms, affect thresholds that change the rate and range of signals to which the nervous system responds. This is a far cry from a sole focus on mood or on malevolent behavioral control. We do not have a clockwork orange, not even a clockwork lemon! We do not aim to be controllers of behavior in any event, but rather to enhance self-regulation. In brief, we know, from what we already know of brain function, that there is a kind of order which underlies complex behaviors as it does in the simpler systems with which biology can demonstrate mechanisms. In this sense, reductionism allows-when the sequence of control mechanisms can be described and identified-a clearer understanding of how it is we behave the way we do.
There is much in modern biology to unify our basic approach in psychiatry, whatever our special focus. Many or all of these approaches can teach us something about the limits and nature of material systems through which information is exchanged and coded. I have tried to emphasize that in teaching this we are not losing but gaining in our comprehension of mind. Medawar has referred to the days before empirical truthfulness was thought to be either a necessary or desirable characteristic of professedly factual statements. That we now must seriously attend to factual statements does not mean that they comprehend all of truth, or all of the truth we want to know; nor all the facets of apprehended experience we need to know to tell a truthful story. It is simply that they are a necessary beginning.
So we all face our commonalities with impersonal forces which determine our behavior along with that of the rest of the living species, and yet we seek personal meaning in our brief transit. This tension between biology and the psychology of the self has haunted the history of psychiatry but lies developmentally within each of us [10] . Our problem has been how to rescue the dignity and uniqueness of man for ourselves and our patients, while thoroughly appreciating the descriptions of impersonal biosocial processes-realities that we do not directly apprehend. Insofar as a true behavioral science is requisite for mankind's survival in the 21st century and beyond, this comprehension will be increasingly necessary. It will be if we truly are to transcend our ignorance of man and his limits, and hence realize how to achieve our potential. Piaget described the child's developing grasp of reality as he moves from egocentrism and begins to perceive of himself as an "event among related events."
And it is in that relational context that the new biobehavioral emphases in psychiatric education must continue. It can do so exactly on the generative template of inquiry, imaginative curiosity, and skepticism (i.e., modesty) that Fritz Redlich constructed at Yale.
